In the Twilight of Western Thought

Summary

pretended autonomy of thought pp 1-4

Dooyeweerd opens by drawing attention to a problem for claiming a Christian starting point for philosophy: the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. Theoretical reason is held to be self-sufficient, the ultimate judge, thus this dogma implies that thought ought to be independent of religious presuppositions. The idea that thought can be religiously neutral has been elevated to a condition of philosophy.

This idea philosophical that thought can be autonomous faces a number of problems.

 There is no common foundation; the presuppositions of Greek, Thomistic and modern secularised thought are different. There is no common basis for different philosophical trends.
 Different philosophical trends usually end up arguing at cross-purposes. They are unable to find a way to penetrate to the level of their starting-points. This suggests that the starting points determine the meaning given to this autonomy of thought.

These problems suggest that the dogma of the autonomy of thought needs to be critically investigated.

transcendental criticism pp 4-6

Dooyeweerd then suggests the need to look at the nature of theoretical thought itself. Is this autonomy required by its inner nature? To answer this question requires a transcendental criticism in which the conditions that make theoretical thought possible are sought.

Kant and Husserl both took the autonomy of theoretical thought as a self-evident truth. Both claimed to be radically critical and yet failed to make autonomy into a critical problem.

Dooyewerd does not demand that adherents of the view that thought is autonomous abandon this position, but he does want them to reassess its status by putting it to the test of a transcendental critique.

To understand such a critique we need to examine the structure of theoretical thought. The theoretical attitude of thought and experience display an antithetical structure: the logical and non-logical aspects are opposed.

modal aspects pp 6-9

Our experience has a great diversity of modal aspects. These modal aspects are modalities of meaning, and each has a modal kernel of meaning.

We can tabulate the modal aspects and their kernel as follows:

There has been much discussion over the names and terms used for the different modal aspects and modal kernels as well as their order; however, the main points remain. These are aspects of reality that cannot be reduced to each other.

These modal aspects relate to different special sciences that focus on entities which function within them in a special way; however, these special sciences don’t necessarily tell us about the inner nature and structure of the modal aspects themselves. To understand these requires philosophical insight into the total coherence of the diverse aspects because the modal meaning of an aspect is only unfolded in its coherence with all other aspects.

analogical moments p 9-15

The modal kernels express themselves in what Dooyeweerd terms ‘analogical moments’. These can be retrocipations or anticipations.

If the kernel referred to is part of the preceding aspect then it is a retrocipation; if it refers to the kernel of the successive aspect then it is known as an anticipation.

Dooyeweerd looks at one such example: the meaning kernel of the sensitive aspect.

The meaning kernel of the sensitive aspect is feelings. Emotion, is the sensitive mode of movement and is thus a retrocipation to the movement aspect. Moral feelings is an anticipation to the moral aspect.

‘Was man nicht definieren kann, das sicht man als ein Fuhlen [Fühler] an’ t
ranslates as ‘What one cannot define, one sees as with a feeler’.

subject and object pp 15-17

In pre-theoretical thought things are experienced in the coherence of their aspects. Reflection on this integral experience leads Dooyewerd to distinguish between functioning in an aspect as a subject and functioning in n aspect as an object. Moreover, every thing has a leading function, or a qualifying aspect. In modes higher than its leading function (sometimes called its superstratum) it has an object function. For all aspects lower than its leading function (sometimes called the substratum) it has a subject function.

For a tree, its leading function, or qualifying aspect, is biotic. Hence, for aspects lower than the biotic (i.e. numerical, spatial, kinematic and physical) it has a subject function, in other words, it functions ‘actively’: it has a size which can be measured, it takes up an amount of space, it sways in the breeze, it has certain physical properties, and it is a living thing. In the higher modes, it has an object function, i.e. it functions ‘passively’: it can have certain things done to it, but it of itself cannot do them. Its size, type and colour can be perceived, but it cannot perceive itself (sensitive); it cannot name itself but it can be named (lingual); it cannot think, but it can be thought about (analytical); it has a certain economic value but it cannot engage in economics (economic); it can be possessed but it cannot possess (juridical); and so on.

Hence, all things have either a subject or an object function in all modal aspects. Humans alone function actively as subjects in all modal aspects.

naïve experience pp 17-18

Naïve experience comes before all theories; it is not a theory in itself, and cannot be refuted by philosophical arguments. Dooyeweerd describes it as a pre-theoretical datum – it corresponds to the different modal aspects in their entirety. Any theory that cannot take these modal aspects into account must be flawed.

the true starting point pp. 18-

How do we form a logical concept of the non-logical aspects? Having examined the nature of the theoretical thought, and found its characteristic feature to be the antithetical relation between the logical and non-logical aspects, we must require that the logical and non-logical aspects be bought together in synthesis. Dooyeweerd then raises the important question: ‘What is the central reference-point in our consciousness from which this central theoretical synthesis can start?’ (p 19)

It must start outside theoretical thought, otherwise it is bound to the inter-modal synthesis between logical and non-logical thought. It must be transcendent (outside theoretical thought) rather than immanent (within theoretical thought). An immanent philosophy cannot escape the problem of making theoretical thought autonomous. It will inevitably absolutize one of the modal aspects.

absolutization pp 20-

When a modal aspect is absolutized it leads to an –ism. Some –isms are shown in the table below. Absolutization elevates one aspect to become the totality of meaning so that it becomes an idol.

Kant’s transcendental method pp 21-
The remainder of the chapter examines Kant’s critical transcendental method and shows that Kant’s real starting point remains in the dark. Dooyeweerd’s radical critique seeks to uncover the starting point. Dooyeweerd’s critique goes further than Kant’s.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Kant attempted to mediate between rationalism and empiricism. His major works include A Critique of Pure Reason (1781), A Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and A Critique of Judgment (1993)

Key terms

absolutization One aspect of our experience becomes the totality of meaning; it makes an idol of that aspect
analogical moments Expressions of the kernel meaning of an aspect which refers to the kernels of other aspects. These can be either retrocipations or anticipations
anticipation An analogical moment within a modality that refers to the meaning kernel of a higher mode
antithetical Having an opposition or a strong contrast or an exact opposite
autonomy Derived from two Greek terms auto and nomos, it means without law; i.e. self-governing or guided by its own principles
autonomy of thought The idea that thought is guided by its own principles
cosmic time The ‘medium’ through which the meaning totality is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects
modal aspects The fifteen (or so) irreducible aspects of reality: numerical, spatial and so on. Dooyeweerd also calls them modal spheres, law spheres, modalities, modes or aspects.
modal kernel The internal modality of meaning of an aspect (also called a nuclear moment)
modern secularised Contemporary thought that doesn’t take God into consideration; at the time Dooyeweerd was writing this would have included positivism
naïve thought This is pre-theoretical thought – everyday experience.
presuppositions What is taken for granted or presupposed
retrocipation An analogical moment that refers to a meaning kernel of an earlier mode
supra-temporal The supra-temporal means literally above the temporal; it includes the eternity of God. This is the realm of faith commitments
temporal horizon This is created reality
theoretical thought Any kind of abstract thought such as philosophy, theology or the sciences
transcendental critique A kantian term used to mean a discovery of the conditions needed for something to operate or be
Thomistic thought Thought associated with Thomas Aquinas

Review questions

1. What is meant by the autonomy of thought?
2. Why does Dooyeweerd call it the ‘pretended autonomy of thought’?
3. Why is the dogma of theoretical thought facing a critical problem?
4. What does Dooyeweerd mean by a qu[a]estio iuris?
5. Why does philosophy need a transcendental critique of theoretical thought?
6. How is the theoretical attitude of thought characterised?
7. What is meant by the temporal horizon of human experience?
8. Why was the fundamental difference between theoretical and non-theoretical thought entirely misinterpreted?
9. Identify the different analogies in the historical aspect.
10. Which modal aspect will have (a) no anticipations and (b) no retrocipations?
11. What is naïve realism? Why does Dooyeweerd reject it?
12. Why does Kant’s view of the transcendental ego land in ‘pure mythology’?

Study questions
1. Are there any other problems for claiming a Christian starting point for philosophy?
2. According to Dooyeweerd ‘autonomy’ means different things in different philosophies, what is the meaning of autonomy for Dooyeweerd? How does it relate to the views of autonomy he is arguing against?
3. Does theology have to have philosophical presuppositions?
4. Choose a theological system and identify its philosophical presuppositions.
5. How does supra-theoretical, theoretical and pre-theoretical thought differ?
6. How does Dooyeweerd’s concept cosmic time relate to the supra-temporal and temporal time?
7. Identify the different modal aspects that occur in the chemical element oxygen.
8. Identify the –isms that absolutize the numerical, the spatial and the movement aspects of reality.
9. Compare and contrast Kant’s and Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.

Take it further

The Dooyeweerd pages provides a good summary of Dooyeweerd’s thought including the modal aspects: http://www.isi.salford.ac.uk/dooy/summary.html#fwm
and http://www.isi.salford.ac.uk/dooy/aspects.html
Glenn Friesen’s definitions
D. F. M. Strauss ‘The order of the modal aspects’ in Contemporary Reflections on the Philosopy of Herman Dooyeweerd.
Spier ch 2
Kalsbeek chs 8-9; 11-14
Clouser ch 11
Wolfe ch 1-13

Updated 17 Sept 2005

Dooyeweerd at the end of his first lecture (Chapter 1) introduces hi theme for this lecture by posing some questions:

 What is the nature of the enigmatical I?
 How can we arrive at real self-knowledge?

Read the next chapter with these questions in mind.

Summary

the enigmatic character of the ego pp 27-30
Chapter 2 takes up where chapter 1 ended: the enigmatic character of the human I. All attempts to understand the central human ego appear to be failures.

Buber’s I–thou relation is examined – the reference to the humanist science ideal will be explained later – as well Binswanger’s concept of ‘meeting in love. Both are found to be ‘empty in themselves’.

Martin Buber (1878-1965)

Buber was an Austrian/ Jewish philosopher, theologian and thinker. He is best know for his work I and Thou (1923)

Ludwig Binswanger (1881 - 1966)

Binswanger was a Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher influenced by existentialism and personalism. He is the author of Being-in-the-World (1963)

the relation to the divine origin pp 30-33
In order to explain the human ego it must be considered in relation to its divine origin. This means we have to go beyond the boundaries of philosophical thought. Nevertheless this is necessary, for the supra-theoretical central motive is of a religious character. The religious impulse of the ego takes its content from religious basic motives. These basic religious motives can either turn the ego towards or away from its true origin.

the religious basic motive pp 33-35
The religious basic motive is communal. It rules us even if we are unaware of it. It is bound to two conditions; it must:

 give rise to a common belief within the faith aspect
 gain a socio-cultural power within the historical aspect of human society; it forms that culture.

the four religious basic motives pp. 35-38
There are four religious basic motives: the Greek form-matter; the biblical creation-fall-redemption; the scholastic nature-grace; and the modern humanistic nature-freedom.

All these, apart from the biblical one, are dualistic – two motives are held in opposition to each other.

the form-matter motive pp 38-41
This is the fundamental motive of Greek thought. It originates from a meeting of two conflicting views the pre-Homerian natural religion – corresponding to matter – and the Olympian gods’ cultural religion – corresponding to form.

creation, fall and redemption pp 41-44
This is the biblical motive. It is the motive of the creation, the radical fall due to sin, and redemption in Jesus Christ. This is the genuine starting point for a Christian philosophy.

nature – grace pp 44-45
The nature-grace motive was introduced by Catholicism. It was an attempt to reconcile the opposed religious motives of Greek and Christian thought.

modern Humanism: freedom-nature motive pp 45-51
The fourth ground motive is that of nature and freedom. Modern Humanism introduced it. It takes two forms: the freedom-motive, with its emphasis on liberty and autonomy; and the nature-motive with its emphasis on the domination of nature through science and mathematics.

Natura naturans means creative nature
Deus sive natura means God is not distinguishable from nature

threefold basic idea 52
This Dooyeweerd calls the ‘cosmonomic idea’.

two key questions pp. 52-3
Dooyeweerd poses two important questions and then goes on to answer them.
 How can this criticism have any conclusive force for those who do not accept your religious starting point?
 what may be the common basis for a philosophical discussion between those who lack a common starting-point?

the first question answered pp 53-54
The criticism of theoretical thought exposes facts that are of a transcendental significance and can be accepted by all, whatever their philosophical starting point.
Common grace means that truths are contained in all philosophies, despite the fact that operate from apostate basic motives.

the second question answered pp 54-7
Dooyeweerd claims that the radical transcendental critique of theoretical thought is of universal value for all philosophy students. Only when we can get to the supra-theoretical presuppositions can we critique each others philosophy.

unsolvable antinomies pp 57-
When one modal aspect is reduced to another unsolvable antinomies occur. For example: Zeno’s paradox. The problem arises when length (a spatial aspect) is reduced to a numerical aspect.

Key terms

ananke This is the Greek term for ‘fate’
central human ego (aka heart, I-ness, selfhood) the concentration point of a human’s existence, ‘the religious root unity’ of humanity.
Origin
personality ideal One part of the nature-freedom ground motive. It emphasises the freedom aspect.
religious basic motives (aka religious ground motives) a driving force, a fundamental motivation.
science ideal One part of the nature-freedom ground motive. It emphasises the nature aspect. It comes from the desire to dominate nature.

Review questions
1. What does Dooyeweerd mean by the ‘concentric direction of human thought’?
2. Why are Buber’s and Binswanger’s attempts to explain the human self ‘empty in themselves’?
3. Why does the relation between the human ego and God ‘exceed the boundaries of philosophical thought?
4. Why is the religious ground motive the real starting point of philosophical thought?
5. What effects do the faith-power and the socio-cultural power, which the religious basic motive has, have?
6. In what ways is the nature-grace motive a mutual accommodation of the Christian and Greek religious motives?
7. How does the freedom-nature motive show its ‘central religious character’?
8. How does the ‘inner religious dialectic of the Humanistic basic motive’ show itself?
9. What are the different emphases of the freedom-motive and the nature-motive?
10. How does the science-ideal give rise to a ‘historicistic view of the temporal world’?
11. Why is Christian philosophy a fallible human activity?
12. Why is the cosmonomic idea described as being three fold?
13. If someone doesn’t accept Dooyeweerd’s starting point, how can his criticism have any force?
14. How has Dooyeweerd ‘clearly revealed’ ‘the central influence of the different religious basic motives upon theoretical thought’?
15. Why does a transcendental critique of philosophical thought not result in a general relativism?

Study questions
1. Examine other concepts of the central human ego? Are they also ‘empty in themselves’?
2. How does a religious basic motive enable understanding between different philosophical trends?
3. Why the necessity of a radical transcendental critique of philosophical thinking?
4. How does Descartes’ philosophy illustrate science-ideal?
5. How is the freedom-motive evident in Romanticism?
6. Is there a common basis for a philosophical discussion?
7. What does the term ‘Word of God’ mean for Dooyeweerd?

Taking it further
A summary of Dooyeweerd’s religious ground motives is found at the Dooyeweerd pages: here and here

Glenn Friesen’s pages here

Basden at the Dooyeweerd pages notes that ‘Choi makes a study of Korean religious ground motives using a Dooyeweerdian approach. He identifies the following:
• ‘Korean Shamanism has a ground motive of Hananim-Nature, but is not as dialectical as the ancient Matter-Form motive because Nature spirits acknowledged the supremacy of Hananim (supreme God).
• Korean Buddhism has a ground motive of Kyo-Son (doctrine - meditation).
• Korean Confucianism has a ground motive of I-Ki (li-chi in Chinese), in which I is the universal patterning or forming principle while Ki is the concretizing material and energizing vital force.’

Dooyeweerd’s Roots of Western Culture; Pagan, Secular and Christian options, Wedge Publishing Company, Toronto, Canada, 1979 deals in more depth with religious ground motives.

Kalsbeek ch 5